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The current collapse of credit markets has left small and medium firms 
(SMEs) facing severe credit rationing, which erodes working capital and 
strongly influences the viability of investment projects. With credit markets 
frozen and borrowers competing for credit, the ability to screen borrowers 
by their risk level has become a paramount pursuit for both lenders and 
firms. From the lender side, mechanisms are needed to observationally sort 
equivalent loan applicants, and to mitigate adverse selection and moral 
hazard inefficiencies generated by imperfect information. From the 
borrower side, proper screening mechanisms reduce credit rationing, thus 
increasing good borrowers’ access to credit. 
Among the extant screening mechanisms, lenders may employ collateral 
requirements to achieve a separating equilibrium that reveals information 
that can resolve credit rationing.
1
 In particular, Bester 1985b shows that 
lenders may offer a menu of contracts with different interest rates and 
collateral combinations that act as a firm self-selection mechanism. 
Applicants with lower-risk projects are willing to accept higher collateral at 
a lower premium, while those with higher-risk projects select unsecured 
debt at a higher premium. At such equilibrium, lenders are capable of 
indirectly distinguishing between borrowers of different risk levels, despite 
the imperfect information setting.
2
 
Notwithstanding the relevance of the screening-mechanism implications, 
these models have never been empirically tested. We fill this gap by 
providing the first empirical test of the Bester (1985b) model, which also 
represents the first empirical test on the screening role of loan contracts that 
consider collateral-interest margins simultaneously. So far, the empirical 
literature has focused on the relationship between collateral and borrower 
risk, never on the relationship: collateral-interest margin and borrower risk. 
The literature
3
 shows that secured lending is associated with risky 
borrowers (Orgler 1970; Hester 1979; Scott and Smith 1986; Leeth and 
                                                 
1
 Much of the theoretical work on collateral and asymmetric information focuses on 
“outside” collateral, i.e., assets not owned by the firm; assets which the lender might 
otherwise not claim (see Chan and Kanatas 1985, Besanko and Thakor 1987, Chan and 
Thakor 1987, Deshons and Freixas 1987, Igawa and Kanatas 1990, Stiglitz and Weiss 
1992). Only a very small number of papers deals with the role of “inside” collateral, i.e., 
assets of the business itself (see Smith and Warner (1979), Stulz and Johnson (1985), 
Swary and Udell (1988), and Gorton and Kahn (2000)). Here, we concentrate 
exclusively on outside collateral. 
2
 A more detailed discussion of the theoretical literature can be found in Coco (2000). 
3
 Berger and Udell (1998) offers a comprehensive review of the empirical literature.  
 3 
Scott 1989; Berger and Udell 1990 and Berger and Udell 1992; Booth 
1992; Jimenez and Saurina 2004). Only Cressy (1996), Machauer and 
Weber (1998), and Burke and Hanley (2006) find the opposite relationship, 
all on samples of SMEs. 
The small business community’s relationship with banks is strongly 
characterized by ex ante asymmetric information, leading to credit 
rationing and higher interest charges for small businesses, as compared to 
larger firms
4
. We thus concentrate on the small-firm credit market, 
differing from most of the empirical literature. We use a unique data set 
composed of bank loans to SMEs granted by 28 Spanish banks, which have 
the common attribute of being backed by the Spanish mutual guarantee 
institution (MGI),
5
 Sociedad de Garantia Reciproca (SGR) Comunidad 
Valenciana. 
Also, our unique data set on bank loans to SMEs gives us information, on a 
loan-by-loan basis, about the kind of collateral, the interest rate, the loan 
volume, the loan term, and more importantly, the ex post loan performance 
(e.g., whether the loan is repaid or defaults). Therefore, this data set allows 
us to use a more direct approximation for each borrower risk level 
(privately known to the borrower and, consequently, ex ante unobservable). 
The ex ante borrower risk is a difficult concept to measure in any empirical 
setting, precisely because it is privately known by the borrower. Some 
literature has used interest-rate premiums as proxies for borrower risk 
(Berger and Udell, 1990; Burke and Hanley, 2006), or “company age” or 
experience (Leeth and Scott, 1989; Cressy 1996), and some has 
concentrated on borrower credit rating (Hester,1979; Machauer and Weber, 
1998). Berger and Udell (1990), as a novelty in this kind of research, used 
loan performance on an ex post basis to corroborate their previous results; 
however, as the required data were not individually reported, they used 
aggregate data. Jimenez and Saurina, 2004, following Berger and Udell, 
1990, also used a measure of ex post loan performance. 
Thus, our second innovation comes from our data set. This data set allows 
us to focus on SMEs and to use the ex post loan performance on a loan-by-
loan basis to proxy the ex ante borrower risk. We follow Berger and Udell 
(1990), who support the use of ex post loan performance since it is not 
affected by the monitoring cost of collateral. However, we use 
individualized rather than aggregate ex post performance measures. Only 
Berger and Udell (1990) and Jimenez and Saurina (2004) have had access 
to the ex post loan performance, but on loans to larger firms. 
                                                 
4
 Small firms do not typically have audited financial statements, and are unlikely to be 
monitored by rating agencies or the financial press. Further, the evaluation of small 
borrower creditworthiness does involve fixed costs that turn out to generally be high. 
5
 MGI stands for mutual guarantee institution. We use Zecchini and Ventura (2009) 
notation. 
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Further, the sample period covers an entire economic cycle (from 1982 to 
1998), which includes both recessions and growth periods (it even captures 
the last years of the oil crisis and the subsequent period), which allows us 
to ensure the robustness of our results despite the effects of trends in 
interest rates, economic growth, and credit rationing. 
Another important issue regarding SMEs and the screening models is 
overconfidence. Businesspersons may tend to overestimate their own 
probability of success or their own entrepreneurial skills and experience 
(see, for instance, De Meza and Southey, 1996; Camerer and Lovallo, 
1999; Arenius and Minniti, 2005). However, an implicit assumption of the 
theoretical models we test is that borrowers can correctly assess their ex 
ante (project) risk while choosing a particular contract type. If there are 
optimistic borrowers who underestimate their chances of going bankrupt, 
they will borrow at the higher collateral and lower premium contract, but 
they will probably default. Subsequently, no screening would be found in 
our analysis, as we use ex post loan performance (e.g., whether the loan is 
repaid or defaults) as borrower risk proxy. However, if screening does 
occur, overconfidence will be found not to be strong enough to rule out the 
screening mechanism of contracts combining appropriate pairs of collateral 
and interest rates. 
Empirical testing, thus far, has not addressed this question. Therefore, as 
our third innovation, we provide empirical evidence on the robustness of 
this screening mechanism against SMEs overconfidence. We are able to 
test whether overconfidence affects screening as a result of the use of the ex 
post loan performance proxy. 
To empirically test the Bester model, we run a logit model where the 
dependent variable is defined as the type of contract, and the independent 
variable is the ex ante unobservable borrower risk. We also control for 
factors such as firm size, firm legal form, loan term, and loan maturity. Our 
dependent variable is a binary variable that incorporates two types of 
contracts: one with real estate “outside” collateral and a low interest rate, 
and the other with no collateral and a high interest rate. The hypothesis to 
be tested is whether this menu of contracts allows screening of borrowers 
with respect to their ex ante unobservable risk. 
Our results suggest that by combining collateral appropriately with interest 
rate, borrowers with different risk levels are separated; and the high-risk 
borrowers accept loans without collateral and with high interest rates. On 
the other hand, the low-risk borrowers accept loans with strong collateral 
and low interest rates. This constitutes the first empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of collateral as a separating mechanism when it is adequately 
combined with interest rates. 
The evidence does not contradict the existence of adverse selection or 
moral hazard effects triggered by collateral, as described by Stiglitz and 
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Weiss (1981) and Wette (1983), but it indicates that when collateral is 
appropriately combined with interest rate, it proves to be an excellent 
screening mechanism for borrowers characterized by differing risk levels. 
Our results also suggest that overconfidence among SME entrepreneurs is 
not strong enough to overcome the screening mechanism of contracts 
combining appropriate pairings of collateral and interest rates. 
In the next section, our theoretical model and hypotheses are presented. In 
Section 3, the database and methodology are described. We present our 
results in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes our main conclusions. 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL AND CONTRAST HYPOTHESIS 
Our analysis follows the Bester (1985b) model. It considers a credit market 
with Ni risk neutral firms, which can either be type i = a or b, according to 
their project risk level. Each firm has the possibility of starting a project 
that requires an initial fixed investment I. The return on the project for firm 
i is given by the random variable 
~
R i, with 0 < 
~
R i < Ri and a distribution 
function Fi(R) > 0 for all R > 0. As in Rostchild and Stiglitz (1970) and 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
~
R b has a greater risk than 
~
R a according to the 
second order stochastic dominance criterion. The firms have initial wealth 
W<I, which together with a loan B = I-W, finances the project. Given the 
size of the loan, B, a credit contract  = (r, C) is specified by interest rate r 
and collateral C. Potential borrowers may face collateralization costs 
assumed to be proportional to the amount of collateral. When C > (1+r)B, 
the firm does not admit project failure. Therefore, only contracts with C < 
(1+r)B are considered. It is assumed that firm i’s project fails if C + Ri < 
(1+r)B; this becomes observable only after a firm declares project failure. 
If this happens, the bank becomes the owner of the investment project and 
its returns. Thus, the expected profit from the project for firm i and a credit 
contract  is given by: 
i() = E{máx [
~
R i - (1+r) B - kC, -(1+k) C]}.   [1] 
Banks cannot screen borrowers by risk; however, they can screen them by 
offering a pair of contracts (, ) that are incentive-compatible and act as 
self-selecting mechanisms. The pair (, ) is incentive-compatible if: 
a() > a(); b() > b()    [2] 
Firm i will invest only if it receives a loan  such that i() > (1+ ) W. So 
long as a pair of contracts (, ) is offered, the firm prefers a contract that 
maximizes its expected profits. Thus, if preferences of potential borrowers 
depend systematically on their risk levels, banks can utilize a menu of 
contracts with different collateral requirements as self-selection 
mechanisms. In order to solve the problem of adverse selection, Bester 
(1985) concludes that low-risk firms try to differentiate themselves from 
high-risk firms by accepting higher collateral, as collateral is costly. Thus, 
collateral serves to reveal the riskiness of an entrepreneur’s project. 
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The isoprofit curves for the two types of loan applicants are depicted 
in Figure 1. Applicant b’s isoprofit curve has a steeper slope than applicant 
a’s, because applicant b’s project is riskier and, by stochastic dominance of 
second degree, profits are a convex function of realized returns (R). This 
means that type a firms are inclined to accept a higher increment in 
collateral for a given reduction in interest rates than type b firms. This fact 













More specifically, Bester states that low-risk firms are more inclined to 
accept an increase in collateral requirements for a given reduction in 
interest rate than are high-risk firms, since banks decide upon the interest 
rate and the collateral of their contracts simultaneously rather than 
separately. 
In accordance with this framework, a menu of two incentive-compatible 
contracts could be defined. One contract would be characterized by a 
combination of low collateral and a high interest rate, and the second would 
be characterized by a combination of high collateral and a low interest rate. 
Bester states that between two such contracts, lower-risk borrowers tend to 
accept the second contract, and higher-risk borrowers tend to accept the 
first one. 
The hypothesis to be tested is thus whether rewarding high “outside” 
collateral with a lower interest rate enables screening for lower-risk 
borrowers. 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS—SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
To empirically test the Bester (1985b) model and to gauge the screening 
capability of loans characterized by a particular combination of collateral 
                                                 
6
 In Bester (1985b), self-selection results from stronger assumptions than in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). To 
produce a separating equilibrium, the additional assumption that Fi(R) > 0 for all R > 0 is needed. With 
this assumption, it is possible to have a monotonic relationship between risk and borrower preferences. 
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and interest rate, we run a logit model where the dependent variable is 
defined as the menu of contracts analyzed in Bester and the independent 
variable is borrower risk level. 
To depict the menu of contracts, we define two contract types: Contract C1, 
characterized by a combination of no collateral and a high interest rate 
spread, and Contract C2 characterized by a combination of real state 
“outside” collateral and a low interest rate spread. We define interest rate 
spread as the difference between each loan initial interest rate and the legal 
interest rate in that period as disclosed in the Bank of Spain Bulletin. High 
and low interest rate spread are defined, respectively, as spreads whose 
variations are at least %2  from the legal interest rate. Loans with an 
intermediate rate of interest and those with surety guarantee are excluded 
since our aim is to address theoretically incentive-compatible contracts. If 
the Bester model applies, lower-risk borrowers will accept C2 contracts 
more frequently, and higher-risk borrowers will accept C1 contracts. 
We use data on 323 anonymous bank-loan contracts granted by 28 Spanish 
banks to SMEs for the period 1982–1998. Thus, the sample period covers 
an entire economic cycle (from 1982 to 1998) with both recession and 
growth periods (it even captures the last years of the oil crisis and the 
subsequent period), which allows us to ensure the robustness of our results 
despite the effects of trends in interest rates, economic growth, and credit 
rationing. Data are provided by SGR Comunidad Valenciana, an MGI that 
provides banks with guarantees against their loans to SMEs. All loans 
correspond to PLCs, limited liability companies, and sole proprietors. 
Among the loans, there are 172 that combine real state collateral with a low 
rate of interest (Contract C2) and 151 that combine no collateral with a 
higher interest rate (Contract C1). 
To test the Bester model, we define our dependent variable, contract type, 
as a binary variable that takes the value 1 for Contract C1, and the value 0 
for Contract C2. To proxy the ex ante, i.e., privately known, borrower risk 
we use the known ex post loan performance, which is available in our data 
set. Thus, the explanatory variable, ex post loan performance, is measured 
by Risk , a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for non-defaulted loans, 
and 0 for defaulted ones. Our definition of defaulted loans includes any 
non-performing loan, not only legal insolvency, i.e., non-performing loans 
(90 days), and doubtful loans. 
The ex ante borrower risk is a difficult concept to measure in any empirical 
setting, precisely because it is privately known by the borrower. However, 
as Berger and Udell (1990) point out, the advantage of using the ex post 
loan performance as a proxy (instead of interest rate premium) is that it is 
not affected by the monitoring cost of collateral. 
We also control for factors such as loan size ( Lsize), loan maturity ( Lterm ), 
loan destination ( Ldest ), firm size ( Fsize ), and firm legal form ( )1(Firmtype  
 8 
and )2(Firmtype ). All these factors have been found to affect the level of ex 
ante borrower risk (Hester 1979; Leeth and Scott 1989; Berger and Udell 
1990; Machauer and Weber 1998). 











                          [3]
 
 where itContract  and itRisk  stand for the type of contract and project risk (as 
defined above), itLsize  is measured by local currency, itLterm  is measured in 
months, itLdest is measured by a binary variable that takes the value 0 when 
the loan is used to start a new business, and 1 otherwise; itFsize is measured 
by the number of employees in the firm, and firm legal form is defined by 
three different dummy variables, Firmtype , )1(Firmtype  and )2(Firmtype , as 
follows: )1(Firmtype  is a binary variable that is given the value 1 for sole 
proprietors, and 0 for limited liability companies and for PLCs; )2(Firmtype  
stands for a binary variable that is given the value 1 for limited liability 
companies, and 0 for sole proprietors and for PLCs; and Firmtype  is defined 
as a dummy variable that takes the value 0 for sole proprietors, 1 for 
limited liability companies, and 2 for PLCs, and is used strictly for the 
analysis of variance. 
Finally, to test whether the logit function is robust against a change in the 
sample, the total sample is disaggregated into estimation and validation 
subsamples. The estimation subsample is composed of formalized loans 
from January 1, 1983 to May 31, 1998 and consists of 172 loans of 
Contract C2 and 131 loans of Contract C1. The validation subsample is 
composed of 20 loans formalized in 1982, all characterized by no collateral 
and high interest rate. The choice of estimation subsample was determined 
by the convenience of using a balanced sample in terms of the number of 
each contract type. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our results are conclusive. By appropriately combining collateral with 
interest rate, borrowers with different risk levels are disaggregated: high-
risk borrowers accept loans without collateral and with high interest rates; 
low-risk borrowers accept loans with real state asset collateral and with low 
interest rates. Hence, we provide the first empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of collateral as a disaggregating screening mechanism when it 
is adequately combined with interest rate, as modeled in Bester (1985b). 
The results of the logit estimation, as shown in Table 1, clearly highlight 
the efficacy of the screening mechanism, since the selected menu of 
contracts allows screening borrowers according to their ex ante 
unobservable risk. The coefficient of Risk  clearly shows that Contract C2 
loans have no default problems, despite the higher observed risk. This 
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result is also shown in the analysis of variance (see Table 2). In contrast, 
loans without collateral and with high interest rates have a high probability 
of default. 
However, in line with the empirical literature, strong collateral is related to 
loans with higher ex ante observed risk: When loan characteristics cause 




Table 1. Test of the combination collateral-interest rate; logit results. 
 
The estimation sample consists of 303 loans to SMEs guaranteed by Spanish SGRs from 1983 to 1998 
(1982 is used only for the validation subsample). Contract  is the endogenous variable, which takes the 
value 1 for a loan contract formalized with no collateral and high interest rate, which is labeled C1 (172 
observations), and takes the value 0 for a contract combining real state asset collateral with a low rate of 
interest, which is labeled contract C2 (131 observations). The exogenous dummy variables )1(Ftype , 
)2(Ftype , Aim  and Risk  are given the value 1 in the case of sole proprietors and PLCs, investments 
not corresponding to the set-up of a new company, and in cases of non-repayment, respectively. Variable 
Fsize  is firm size, measured as number of employees, Lsize  and Lterm  represent loan size (in euros) 
and loan term (in months), respectively. The table shows coefficient values and Wald statistics (in 
parentheses). *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 




)1(Ftype  -1.8117*** 
(9.2702) 

















Likelihood Test 238.690*** 
Cox-Snell R2 0.545 
Nagelkerke R2 0.7341 
 
Correct classification  
89.11% of estimation sample 
100% of validation sample 
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Table 2. Test of the combination collateral-interest rate. 
 
Results of the normality and homoskedasticity tests and analysis of the variance are shown for both kinds 
of contract. P-values in parentheses. )1(Ftype , )2(Ftype , Aim  and Risk  are dummy variables that 
are given the value 1 in the case of sole proprietors, PLCs, investments not corresponding to the set-up of 
a new company, and in cases of non-repayment, respectively. Fsize  is firm size, and is measured by 
number of employees, Lsize  and Lterm  represent loan size (in euros) and loan term (in months), 
respectively. * Correction of the significance of Lilliefors. **Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
***Level of significance is in parentheses. 
 1.1. Normality and 
Homoskedasticity Test 


























































































































Our results also suggest that overconfidence among SME entrepreneurs is 
not strong enough to overcome the screening mechanism of contracts that 
combine appropriate pairs of collateral and interest rates, since the 
separation of borrowers into two different contracts is clear-cut. 
With respect to goodness of fit, Table 1 shows that all the coefficients are 
significantly different from zero. The joint significance of the model is high 
when determining the probability of providing collateral combined with a 
low rate of interest, as shown by the value of the Chi-square statistic. As to 
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the robustness check, the validation of the model is very high, as shown by 
the high percentage of loans correctly classified according to estimated 
probability (89.11%). The model correctly classified 270 of 303 analyzed 
loans.
7
  Hence, this menu of contracts enables correct screening of 
borrowers by risk level, clustering those with lower risk in Contract C2. 
Other insights on the characterization of firms by contract type can be 
drawn.  Table 1 shows that a loan with real state collateral and low interest 
rate is more likely the longer the loan term ( Lterm ), the larger the loan size 
( Lsize), and the lower the number of employees in the firm ( Fsize ). This 
happens particularly when the borrower is a sole proprietor or a company 
(PLC) and when the money is invested in a start up business. All these 
results are reinforced by the analysis of variance shown in Table 2.
8
 
Table 2 shows that each of the exogenous variables clearly differentiates 
the two types of contract, except )1( Firmtype . Interestingly, the Risk  
coefficient shows that 98% of Contract C2 borrowers repay their loans (only 
2% of loans defaulted), whereas loans without collateral and with high 
interest rate show a much higher default rate, 32%. 
Most of the SMEs willing to borrow at Contract C2 (real state external 
collateral and low interest rate) are limited companies and sole proprietors. 
PLCs have a greater presence in the Contract C1 group (no collateral and 
higher interest rate), as shown by the mean values of the variables Firmtype , 
)1( Firmtype  and )2( Firmtype . Moreover, Contract C2 is held by SMEs with 
smaller numbers of employees, higher mean loan terms and higher loan 
sizes than SMEs with Contract C1. Regarding loan destination, the weight 
of loans for business start-ups is higher in Contract C2 (13% of total loans 
in this group, whereas they represent only 4% of Contract C1 loans). 
Additionally, Table 2 shows the low impact of overconfidence on our 
results. This is another advantage of using ex post loan performance as a 
proxy for ex ante borrower risk. An implicit assumption of the theoretical 
models we are testing is that borrowers can correctly assess their ex ante 
risk while choosing a particular contract type. However, borrowers might 
overestimate their probability of success or their entrepreneurial skills and 
experience (see for instance De Meza and Southey, 1996; Camerer and 
Lovallo, 1999; Arenius and Minniti, 2005). If there were optimistic SME 
entrepreneurs who underestimated their chances of going bankrupt and who 
                                                 
7
 A 100% correct classification in the validation sample was obtained. In addition, there is a low 
correlation among the variables in the final solution. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
8 Implicit hypotheses of the analysis of variance with one factor were tested, as shown in Table 2. Only 
)1( Firmtype  presents equal variance in the two types of loans. However, the lack of homogeneity of 
variance affects the F statistics if the ratio of the larger sample size to the smaller one is above 2; in this 
case it is 1.13. Firmtype , )1( Firmtype , )2( Firmtype , Ldest  and Risk  are categorical, which requires 
caution in the interpretation of the F statistics. 
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were willing to provide the required collateral, they would choose Contract 
C2, but they would be very likely to default. This would negatively impact 
the screening results. However, as these two contracts screen borrowers of 
different risk level, overconfidence is found to be non-significant in this 
screening model. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Inspired by the theoretical models on credit markets with asymmetric 
information that show that borrower preferences among different interest-
collateral combinations systematically depend on their risk levels, we have 
conducted the first empirical test on the screening role of collateral-interest 
rate combinations in bank-loan contracts. 
We have analyzed a unique data set on bank loans to Spanish SMEs backed 
by a Spanish MGI. Consistent with the screening theory, our results suggest 
that by combining collateral appropriately with interest rate, borrowers 
with different risk levels are separated and the higher-risk borrowers are 
clustered in unsecured loans (no-collateral) with high interest rates. On the 
other hand, lower-risk borrowers tend to accept loans characterized by high 
real state external collateral and low interest rates. Hence, we provide the 
first empirical evidence on the effectiveness of collateral as a screening 
mechanism when it is adequately combined with interest rates. Our results 
support the theoretical conclusions with respect to collateral of Bester 
(1985b, 1987), Chan and Kanatas (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987), 
Deshons and Freixas (1987), Igawa and Kanatas (1990), and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1986, 1992). 
Also, the ex post loan performance proxy used has allowed us to observe 
that overconfidence does not overcome the screening mechanism of 
contracts combining appropriate pairs of collateral-interest rates. 
Our evidence does not contradict the existence of adverse selection or 
moral hazard effects triggered by collateral, as described by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) and Wette (1983), but it does indicate that when collateral is 
appropriately combined with interest rate, it becomes an excellent 
screening mechanism for borrowers characterized by different risk levels. 
Though our sample is only composed of Spanish data, our results are easily 
applicable to most credit markets. 
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